Colombia’s path to peace – part 1

When negotiations between the Colombian government of President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC guerilla (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) began on Oct. 8th, 2012, both parties to the negotiations and the general public displayed a healthy amount of distrust and skepticism. Government representatives weren’t quite sure if the revolutionaries were sincere in their wish and will to conduct an honest dialogue and not to use the talks as an insincere tactical motive to rally once more against the government. On the other side of the table, the revolutionaries couldn’t possibly count on the government willingness to provide sustainable solutions and to work toward compromise. And there is a rich history of failures: FARC used the negotiations with the government of Patranas (1998-2002) to reorganize its combat units (Frentes). During the days of the Gaviria government (1990-1991), both sides used to overextend their demands to the point where any suggestion or demand was deemed unacceptable by the other side. The dialogue between the rebels and the Betancur government (1984-1986) failed as the military didn’t cease hostilities.
The killing of thousands of members of the Union Patriotica party, whereby many FARc rebels organized themselves into one party during the negotiations with the Betancur government is not forgotten by the FARC. And this lack of trust and confidence in the motives of the other side is mirrored in the attitudes and negotiation behaviors of the current Havanna Talks: no official cease fire has been brokered or announced and the agreement on negotiated items is only valid when and if there is a complete and comprehensive agreement – called single undertaking in peace agreement terms.

However, the negotiations are quite time consuming and lengthy. Hence, the most icky points have not been talked about yet and President Juan Manuel Santos has invested its entire political capital into the dialogue process, yet he is becoming increasingly impatient and unnerved by the slow progress of the talks. Though both sides had announced a truce which didn’t hold, and the upcoming municipal elections are perceived as a braking pad since FARC isn’t confident that the safety and livelihoods of its disarmed and demobilized fighters can be secured. In many of the rural areas, the government and military lacks presence and therefore it cannot make guarantees as to the security of demobilized fighters since local and regional elites do not feel tied by any of the ceasefire provisions between the government and the FARC. And rightly so: the perception and general question is that this is a peace process for the sake of the government yet the general population in both urban and rural areas and in the region at large needs to support the peace process. Beyond the population, important stakeholders such as the military, economic and political elites need to be tackled as well so as to not become spoilers to the national dialogue process.

Beyond the actors mentioned above, the question still remains as to the role of a smaller rebel group, the ELN (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional), and its current exclusion from the talks. It can be argued that it would be a stretch to assume that it would automatically and without preconditions accept any agreement brokered between the two major parties in the Havanna Talks.

in the next post, I will give an appreciation of the current negotiation results

Political mediation 101 (through the use of case studies)

Dear reader.

For the politically inclined, I created this very simple and straightforward overview of the key steps of political mediation, making not use of theory but of practice, for your consideration. As always: comments and critiques and additions are welcome!

Mediation entry

Step1: Preparing entry

Case study: Burundi mediation

Mediator is identified and commissioned:

The initiative to begin the process of peace negotiations for Burundi was mainly made in 1995 by Governments and Heads of State of the Great Lakes Region. In other words, it was a Regional Initiative. The Late Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere was requested to mediate in the Burundi peace negotiations in 1995. (Mpangala, 2004: 14)

Nyerere died in 1999 and former South African President Nelson Mandela was appointed as the new mediator in November 1999. Mandela had his first meeting with Burundians parties on January 16, 2000 to provide a new impetus to the peace process. (Kitevu and Lind, 2001:2)

The profile of the mediator is presented to the parties for consideration and endorsement

After studying the situation in Burundi Mwalimu accepted the responsibility as mediator and began work in April and May 1996 in Mwanza. Mwalimu was chosen because he had long experience on the affairs of Burundi as a nationalist leader and President of the United Republic of Tanzania. As a retired President he was a respected national and international figure with enough knowledge and wisdom to enable him play the role as mediator for Burundi. He was also accepted by the Burundi negotiating parties in Mwanza and later on in Arusha. (Mpangala, 2004: 14)

Despite his limited knowledge on Burundi politics, Mandela also came in as the second mediator. While Nyerere was viewed as having been opposed to “whites”, Mandela scarcely opposed to “apartheid” had sought reconciliation with them. It is precisely this reputation as reconciler which paved his way as Nyerere’s successor. The parties argued that Mandela had the capability to identify and correct a number of weaknesses in the methodology and management. Also, coming from a regional super-power, Mandela was considered influential to the process bearing in mind that South Africa had the military capacity to support any agreement (Bentley & Southall, 2005: 68; Daley, 2007: 341)

Step2: Entering the conflict scene

First direct contact between mediator and parties

First meet the parties separately: Nyerere insisted on assurance that Burundian Politicians were both ready to engage in mediation. To receive this assurance, he made quiet visits to Burundi in October and December 1995, where he spoke with the Government, all major parties, civil society, religious leaders, the army, and former Presidents Bagaza and Buyoya. (Arusha I: the background to the Arusha Peace Accord. Available at www.hsrcpress.ac.za/downloadpdf.php)

Mandela had known little about Burundi before he was drawn into the process. He therefore spent much time initially following his appointment as mediator getting to know the delegates and leaders of the different parties and factions. He visited Burundi in preparations of the negotiations, and made two visits outside the capital to meet different stakeholders to the conflict. The negotiations had to be included now if an ongoing peaceful settlement was to be agreed upon (Van Eck, 2000)

Secure a commitment to start mediation: After studying the situation in Burundi, Mwalimu accepted the responsibility as mediator and began work in 1996 in Mwanza, Tanzania. (Mpangala, 2004:13)

Step 3: Mediator analyses parties’ positions and clarify his/her assumptions

Mwalimu preferred to use the methodology of facilitation as an entry point to the mediation process. Facilitation created a special relationship between the facilitator and the negotiating parties such that it provided greater freedom, openings and space for the negotiating parties to make decisions and arrive at consensus. Given the nature of conflicts in Burundi the facilitation approach was viewed by Mwalimu as the best option (Butiku, 2004).

Mediation Middle phase

Step 4: Broadening stakeholder’s engagement 

The issues negotiated were based on five areas of concern, i.e.;

  • The nature of conflict and the problems of genocide and exclusion and solutions to these.
  • Democracy and good governance, dealing with the transitional institutions: the institutional, judicial and administrative systems and questions regarding justice and impunity
  • Peace and security, the cessation of hostilities, the terms of a permanent ceasefire and the question of the security forces.
  • Reconstruction and economic development

Guarantees of the implementation of the agreement            (Daley, 2007: 343; Mokoena, 2005: 65)

In Mwanza in 1996 there were only three negotiating parties that is the government, the UPRONA Party and the FRODEBU party. This means that many parties to the conflict were excluded. After the second session the negotiations broke down due to disagreements on basic principles of the negotiations and the coup d’etat on the 25th June, 1996. When the negotiations resumed in Arusha in 1998 the number of negotiating parties was greatly expanded to include the Government, the National Assembly and seventeen political parties. Altogether there were nineteen negotiating parties. Towards the end of the negotiations a fifth committee to deal with issues of implementation of the peace agreement guarantees was established. In each committee all the 19 negotiating parties were represented. Periodically committees presented their work to plenary sessions for overall discussions. (Mpangala, 2004:14)

Later during the negotiations, parties focused on two main issues:

  • the question of ceasefire and secession of hostilities
  • leadership of the transition period

Step 5: Facilitating negotiations of appropriate options

Mediator assists parties to generate options: Human Rights Watch has noted the “moral tone” which former President Nelson Mandela adopted when he succeeded Nyerere as mediator in the Burundi peace process. From the moment he took on the role in December 1999, he warned parties of the dangers of wasting time whilst ordinary Burundians were dying.

The rebels’ exclusion was widely regarded as the weakest link in the negotiations, as without their participation and agreement a permanent peace was likely to prove elusive. Mandela has secured the agreement in principle to enter negotiations, albeit with conditions, of not only CNDD-FDD, but also the FNL. This won him the respect and praise of President Buyoya who himself agreed to meet with the rebels in South Africa in July 2000. (HSRC Report 1999-2002: Africa: Burundi, http:/www.hrw.org)

Like Nyerere, Mandela used his international status to garner support for the process and to bring pressure to bear upon the Burundian players to come to an agreement. This facilitated in parties generating options to reach an agreement, such as:

  • advocating ethnic power-sharing solutions such as the idea of the presidency revolving between Tutsi and Hutu
  • the demographic composition of the army should reflect that of the population, therefore integration in the army should be based on equal representation of Hutu and Tutsi in order to allay the latter’s fears of domination
  • utilizing the notion of “sufficient consensus” to ensure an inclusive negotiation forum between all parties
  • Cease-fire agreement

(HSRC Report 1999-2002: Africa: Burundi, http:/www.hrw.org)

Shift of viewpoints from position to interests and needs: First, the FRODEBU militants suspect Colonel Epitace Bayaganakandi of some responsibility in the assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye in October 1993. The militants accuse him of having become aware, several days in advance, of the plotting against the elected President, having been forewarned by the gendarmerie, and of having done nothing to save the head of state. They also accuse Epitace Bayaganakandi of being responsible for the killings in the ‘triangle of death’in the Gihosha quarter, situated to the North of the town of Bujumbura, perpetrated by members of the national army, in February 1994, a few days after the investiture of President Cyprien Ntaryamira. (ICG Africa Report No29, 14 May 2001)

However, the attempts to control the rebellion during the Arusha process, ‘in the name of imposition of the principle of the interests of the majority’, were not fruitful. Despite its efforts and repeated meetings with the rebels since Autumn 2000, FRODEBU, which obtained postponement of the threat of regional sanctions in order for FRODEBU to intervene with the rebels, did not succeed in imposing its political leadership on the armed movements.

Step 6: Designing and constructing an agreement

Case study: The Arusha Peace Agreement

From Nyerere to Mandela, parties in the Burundi conflict generated options for a peaceful agreement know as the Arusha Peace Agreement signed in Arusha on the 28th day of the month of August 2000.

The Parties acknowledge the need for the Agreement to be accompanied by and to be a condition for lasting peace and a cessation of violence in Burundi. The Parties accordingly call upon armed wings of non-signatory parties to suspend hostilities and violent actions immediately, and invite such non-signatory parties to participate in or engage in serious negotiations towards a cease-fire. The Parties agree that in addition to this public invitation included herein, they will as a priority take all reasonable and necessary steps to invite such Parties to participate in cease-fire negotiations. (HSRC Report 1999-2002: Africa: Burundi, http:/www.hrw.org)

Mediation Closure

Step 7: Monitoring Mechanisms

Following the groundwork by former mediators Nyerere and Mandela; the implementation and subsequent agreements to the Arusha accord were left to the current mediator Jacob Zuma. The accord for Burundi provided for a 30-month power-sharing arrangement irrespective of the fact that much of the details regarding implementation of the Accord were not decided. As such, Mandela’s role was to continue well into 2001 through meetings with the various parties until agreement could be reached on the nature of the power-sharing agreement, as well as the leadership of the interim government. (Bentley & Southall, 2005: 79; Africa: Burundi, http:/www.hrw.org)

The peace process and other areas of agreement in the Accord were to be overseen by a 29-member Implementation Monitoring Committee to be comprised of representatives of all 19 parties to the negotiations; Burundi Civil Society, member countries to the African Union (formerly known as the Organisation of the African Union). (HSRC Report 1999-2002: Africa: Burundi, http:/www.hrw.org)

Once parties have reached an agreement, an implementation plan has to be put in place to oversee that parties do not deviate from the conditions of the agreement. Lack of implementation plan often leads to an outbreak of conflict. As such, parties should be made aware of the challenges that may befall implementation so that they may consider coming up with monitoring mechanisms or indicators that may be used to monitor the implementation process. The international community may assist in monitoring the agreement by monitoring ceasefires. In Burundi, the IMC was established to oversee and coordinate the implementation of the accord. South African deployed a protection force in the year 2001 with the task of protecting returning politicians. In Ethiopia and Eritrea, the African Union proposed that there be established a peace-keeping mission that will be focused on monitoring hostilities as well as observing the security commitments that were agreed to by both parties.

Step 8: Implementation agreements

Implementation agreements elaborate on the details of comprehensive or framework agreements.

The goal of implementation agreements is to work out the specifics and mechanics of operationalizing comprehensive agreements. They come in varied forms – for example verbal notes, exchanges of letters and joint public statements. In most elaborate implementation agreements, clauses on monitoring, evaluation, verification and dispute resolution are an integral part of the drafting procedure.

Implementing agreements means that the conflict parties act on them, hopefully bringing the dispute in question to an end. Most agreements require that parties carry out specific actions and behave in certain ways. The success of an agreement, therefore, depends on the implementation strategy and the process of putting the plan into operation. It also depends on the degree to which parties feel a sense of ownership of an agreement.

Success depends on:

  • willingness and ability of parties to the conflict to comply with the agreement
  • management of expectations
  • input of locals into planning and design of the agreement
  • monitoring and observing implementation procedures and processes
  • enforcement procedures in cases of non-compliance with the agreement
  • role and power of external monitor(s).

After the Arusha peace process, the Government of Burundi signed a series of ceasefire

agreements as a follow-up to the process. These ceasefire agreements were signed

by the government and the rebel groups that had not taken part in the Arusha peace

process, namely the CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL.

The ceasefire agreements outlined below were signed between 2002 and 2008:

– 2002 Ceasefire between the transitional government and the minority CNDD-FDD faction led by Jean Bosco Ndayikengurukiy, and the minority FNL faction led by Alain Mugabarabona

– 2003 The Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing in Burundi

– 2003 The Pretoria Protocol on Outstanding Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing Issues in Burundi (Pretoria II Protocol)

– 2006 The Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement, signed in Dar es Salaam between the Government of the Republic of Burundi and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL

– 2006 Dar es Salaam Agreement of Principles Towards Lasting Peace, Security and Stability in Burundi

– 2008 The Magaliesburg Declaration on the Burundi Peace Process

Bibliography

Prof. Gaudens P. Mpangala, 2004.Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding in Africa as a Process. Case studies of Burundi and he Democratic Republic of Congo. University of Dar Es Salam. The MWALIMU NYERERE Foundation

Arusha I: the background to the Arusha Peace Accord. Available at www.hsrcpress.ac.za/downloadpdf.php

Butiku, J., 2004, The Facilitation of the Burundi Peace Negotiations. In: Mpangala, G. P., and B. U. Mwansasu (eds), Beyond Conflict in Burundi, Dar es Salaam: Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation

Human Rights Watch World Reports 1999-2002: Africa: Burundi, http://www.hrw.org.

International Crisis Group (ICG) Africa Report No29, 14 May 2001

Kitevu R. and Lind J., 2001. “Enhancing the Arusha Agreement : Environmental aspects of the Burundi Peace process”, African Center for Technologies Studies, Vol1, n2 .

Overview of peace agreements signed in Africa (work in progress)

Dear reader.

Since the study of peace agreements has become the focus of peace and conflict scholars around the world, and since there is merit in conducting more thorough research on the durability of peace agreements, I thought I’d share with you a compilation of peace agreements concluded at the highest levels of political mediation (I am also sharing with you a range of locally brokered peace agreements, see previous posts). I’d be happy if you could leave comments or reflections and I will make sure to continuously update the agreements. Please note that most of the infos are taken from the Uppsala Conflict Database Project, links have been used to refer you back to this amazing site. More agreements from other projects will be shared subsequently as well as an upcoming analysis and appreciation of durable peace agreements.

Angola

  1. The Gbadolite declaration

The Gbadolite Declaration was signed in Zaire on 22 June 1989 between the government of Angola and the UNITA movement. The agreement outlined a process which would lead up to an agreement for a definitive peace in Angola. The agreement stipulated a ceasefire that would be effective from 24 June 1989, and cessation of all hostilities[1]. President Jose Eduardo dos Santos signed for the government and Dr. Jonas Savimbi for UNITA. President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire mediated the talks. Several heads of African states including those from Zambia, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Tanzania and Zimbabwe[2].

  1. The Bicesse Agreement

The Bicesse Accords were signed in Lisbon, Portugal, on 31 May 1991. The agreement outlined the establishment of a ceasefire and a cessation of hostilities between the government and UNITA. The ceasefire covered the entire territory and entailed that the parties would refrain from importing lethal equipment, cease all types of attacks and sabotage and stop the spreading of hostile propaganda. The ceasefire was to be monitored by a joint commission, comprised of the two warring parties and a number of third party actors. Further, the agreement stipulated reforms of the military and security sector, creating an integrated army and a new police force. The talks leading up to the signing of the Bicesse Agreement were mediated by Portugal, while the UN, the USA and the USSR also took part in the process. President Jose Eduardo dos Santos signed for the government and Dr. Jonas Savimbi for UNITA[3].

  1. The Lusaka Protocol

The Lusaka Protocol was signed on the 20th of November 1994 by the government of Angola and UNITA under the mediation of the United Nations. The agreement aimed to implement and to some extent amend the earlier Bicesse Accords of 1991[4]. The agreement reinstated the ceasefire from 1991 which included the withdrawal of UNITA forces from specific locations to allow for a UN monitoring and verification presence in these areas. A demobilization program was created under which military forces were to be demobilized and integrated into civilian society, within the framework of a national social reintegration program to be undertaken by both parties with the assistance of the international community. The ceasefire, the formation of the new armed forces and the demobilization would be monitored and verified by a joint commission and the UN[5]. Angola’s Foreign Minister, Venancio de Moura, signed for the government and UNITA Secretary General Eugenio Manuvakola signed for the rebel movement.

  1. Memorandum of Understanding or Memorandum of Intent

The agreement is best understood as an addendum to the Lusaka Protocol and was signed on 4 April 2002. It reaffirmed a ceasefire and the withdrawal of UNITA troops to quartering locations for demobilization and integration into the national army. The agreement specified the exact numbers of troops to be integrated into the new military and police forces, including high-level posts such as generals and commanding officers[6]. The agreement was mediated by the UN.

  1. Memorandum of Understanding on Peace and National Reconciliation in Cabinda province

(AU)

The agreement was signed by Angolan minister for Territorial Administration, Virgilio de Fontes Pereira and Antonio Bento Bembe, who represented the Cabindan Forum for Dialogue (CFD)[7]. The agreement included provisions for a ceasefire, demilitarization of the CFD controlled areas and a reduction in the number of Angolan armed forces in Cabinda. African Union Chairman and President of the Republic of Congo, Denis Sassou-Nguessou hosted the negotiations.

Burundi

  1. Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi

(OAU)

On 28 August, 2000, 19 parties, including the former warring parties CNDD, FROLINA and PALIPEHUTU signed the Arusha Peace Agreement in Tanzania. The agreement stipulated a ceasefire and a cessation of all hostile attacks, acts of violence against civilians, the supply of armaments and an end to hostile propaganda. The ceasefire entailed no concessions of territory, and all troops remained ‘in situ’, or were to be encamped in prearranged sites to await demobilization or integration into the new armed forces. A joint ceasefire commission was created in order to monitor and supervise the ceasefire and was composed of government delegates, members of the warring parties, the United Nations, the OAU and the Regional Peace Initiative for Burundi[8].

The peace agreement also provided for arrangements for a pre-transition, and then transition, period, which would be followed by democratic elections. The transitional period contained elements of a power-sharing arrangement, assuring the signatories and members of the civil society seats in a transitional National Assembly. A created Senate would be elected on an ethnic basis, ensuring ethnic balance in the higher levels of government[9]. The talks were facilitated first by former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, and then former South African President Nelson Mandela took over. It was signed in the presence of heads of state of countries in the Great Lakes Region as well as representatives from the United Nations, Organization of African Unity (OAU).

  1. Ceasefire Agreement between the Transitional Government of Burundi and the Conseil national pour la défense de ladémocratie-Forces pour la défense de la démocratie

(AU)

This agreement was signed on the 2nd of December 2002 and it brought the CNDD-FDD into the Arusha Accords process, which the rebel group had opposed in 2000[10]. The agreement was a continuation of the initial Arusha Peace Process. President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda was host of the talks. President Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania, and President El Hadj Omar Bongo of Gabon assisted, and the South African Deputy President Jacob Zuma functioned as facilitator with strong support from President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa[11].

  1. The Global Ceasefire agreement between Transitional Government and the Forces pour la defence de la democratie (CNDD-FDD) of Mr. Nkúrunziza

(AU)

The agreement signed on 16 November 2003 finalized the Burundian peace process, binding the parties to all the agreements signed from the 2 December 2002 ceasefire agreement up to the Pretoria protocols on outstanding issues. The agreement brought the CNDD-FDD into the Arusha process, leaving only Palipehutu-FNL outside the peace deals[12]. The Global Ceasefire agreement reaffirmed the earlier agreements reached, and thus provided the CNDD-FDD with extensive power sharing arrangements in both the military/security and the political sectors. The negotiations were facilitated by then South African deputy president Jacob Zuma.

  1. Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Burundi and the Palipehutu-FNL

 

(AU)

 

The Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Palipehutu-FNL and the government of Burundi was signed in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on 7 September 2006 following negotiations since the end of May, which also lead up to the signing of the “Agreement of Principles Towards Lasting Peace, Security and Stability”, a peace process agreement of which this agreement is the final outcome[13]. The agreement stipulated a ceasefire and a cessation of hostilities, to be monitored and verified by the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JVMM), which was to be consisted of the AU, the UN and the warring parties. This mechanism was responsible for the assembly of Palipehutu-FNL combatants and their demobilisation, creation of criteria for integration into the army, or the reintegration into society of ex-combatants. The parties agreed to cease all propaganda between the parties and the incitement of ethnic hatred both within and outside the country. South Africa acted as a mediator and facilitator in the peace talks, which took place in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The AU and the UN were obliged to take part in the JVMM to verify the ceasefire[14].

  1. Declaration of the Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Great Lakes region on the Burundi Peace Process

(AU)

On 4 December 2008 President Nkurunziza and Palipehutu-FNL leader Agathon Rwasa signed a peace agreement in Bujumbura, Burundi. The agreement represented a solution to the final outstanding issues in the peace process between the parties, namely the issue of removal of ethnic references from Palipehutu-FNL’s name and integration of members of the organisation into government[15]. In the agreement, Palipehutu-FNL acknowledged that its name was prohibited by the Burundian Constitution and agreed to change it in order to be able to register as a political party. The government agreed to integrate Palipehutu-FNL into the political process and to grant government positions to 33 of its senior members[16]. The Regional Initiative chaired by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, South African Facilitation led by Minister Charles Nqakula led the negotiations[17].

Central African Republic

Accord de Paix Global entre le Gouvernement de la Republique Centrafricaine et les Mouvements politico-militaires centrafricains designes ci-apres: APRD, FDPC, UFDR

On 21 June 2008 the government of the Central African Republic and representatives of the UFDR, APRD and FDPC signed a peace agreement in Libreville, capital of Gabon. The parties agreed to participate in an inclusive political dialogue. They also agreed to commit to previous agreements including termination of hostilities and amnesty. Gabon facilitated the negotiations[18].

Comoros

  1. The Famboni II Agreement

(OAU)

On 17 February 2001, the Famboni II Agreement was signed by the military government in the Comoro islands, the main opposition and the Anjouan separatists. The Deal was brokered by the OAU and the International Organisation of Francophonie (IOF). Under the agreement, a new transitional government was to be formed to oversee the installation of new institutions. Presidential and general elections were to be held in December 2001[19].

  1. Agreement on the transitional arrangements in the Comoros

(AU)

The parties to the accord agreed that the federal constitution of 2002 was the correct tool for solving the conflict, and thus reaffirmed the federal structure of the Comoros. External defence would remain in the hands of the central government, whilst control of the local police would be placed under the authority of the ‘semi-autonomous’ islands. Further, the gendarmerie would be placed under the joint control of the island presidents to secure a peaceful environment for elections. The Comorian parties agreed to the holding of parliamentary elections within four months from the signing of the agreement and also to the establishment of a new customs regime, which would disperse customs income fairly between the parties. The parties also formed a joint commission for the implementation of the agreement. The agreement was witnessed by the AU, South Africa, Madagascar, Tanzania, Mauritius, Mozambique, France and UN[20].

Congo

Accord de Cessez-le-Feu et de Cessation des Hostilités

The agreement was signed on 29 December 1999 in Brazzaville. The accord follows a previous agreement, “Accord de Cessation des Hostilités en République du Congo”, which was signed on 16 November 1999[21]. The agreement called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the creation of a creation of a “comité de suivi mixte et paritaire” (CDS) to implement the accord. This committee was to oversee the disarmament of the militias, the integration of former fighters into the armed forces and collection of weapons from these groups. The accord also guaranteed the free circulation of people and their goods throughout the country, and allowed for former civil servants to resume their posts. Also stipulated in the accord was the launching of a national dialogue, a “Dialogue National sans exclusif”. This process was to lead to the drafting of a new constitution and to a series of elections to return the country to normal, multiparty political life[22]. Gabon acted as the mediator of the talks.

Democratic Republic of Congo

  1. Lusaka Accord

(OAU)

The accord was signed on the 10th of July 1999. The warring parties agreed to a ceasefire, entailing a cessation of hostilities, an end to the movement of military forces and hostile propaganda and redeployment to defensive positions. Further, it was specified that there would be a complete withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of the DRC within 9 months[23]. A joint military commission, comprised of the warring parties and the UN/OAU observer groups, would be set up to ensure compliance with the ceasefire and to disarm identified militia groups such as the Mayi-Mayi and Interahamwé[24]. Furthermore, it established the deployment of UN peacekeepers and the formation of a national army made up by government and rebel forces. Then Zambian president and Chairman of SADC Fredrick Chilumba mediated the negotiation process. the UN and the OAU were also involved.

  1. Declaration of Fundamental Principles for the Inter-Congolese dialogue

(AU)

The agreement was signed on the 4th of May 2001 and it was signed by the government of DRC and senior officials from the RCD, MLC and RCD-ML. The agreement was a peace process agreement laying the foundations for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. The agreement reconfirmed the parties committment to 14 principles:to respect the provisions of the Lusaka agreement, the sovereignity and the territorial integrity of the country, national reconciliation and a new political order for peace and reconstruction of the DRC, the inclusion of the political opposition and civil society in the dialogue, consensus as the means for adopting all decisions discussed in the negotiations, the holding of elections after the transitional period, the formation of an integrated national army, the utilization of national resources and to halt all acts of violence against civilians[25]. The agreement was facilitated by former Botswana president Ketumile Masire and was also witnessed by Zambia.

  1. Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo

(AU)

The Global and Inclusive Agreement on the transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo was signed in Pretoria on 16 December 2002 during negotiations held by the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and included the warring parties, the political opposition and the civil society of the DRC[26]. The parties reaffirmed the ceasefire modalities from the Lusaka Agreement, the Kampala Withdrawal Plan and the Harare Sub-Agreement in order to cease hostilities and to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict[27]. The parties further agreed to form a restructured, integrated national army comprised of fighters from the different factions. Ketumile Masire was the facilitator as well as South Africa and Moustapha Niasse of Senegal, who had been appointed UN special envoy.

  1. Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations – The Final Act

(AU)

In this agreement, the parties bound themselves to 36 Resolutions adopted by the Inter Congolese Dialogue, The Global and Inclusive Agreement and the Constitution of the Transition. They also reaffirmed the Lusaka Agreement[28]. The Agreement was facilitated by the AU and was witnessed by the UN.

  1. 23 March 2009 Agreement/ The Ihussi Accord

(AU)

The agreement reaffirmed CNDP’s commitment to integrate its members into the police and the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The parties also agreed on a far-reaching reform of the army and security services and the agreement also provided for the creation of a community-based police service to reflect local social diversity[29].

The CNDP would also be transformed into a political party and CNDP officials would be integrated into national politics. The parties also agreed on an evaluation of the Electoral Act. They also reaffirmed national sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of national borders, human rights and fundamental freedoms and duties of citizens, the State as well as the Republican and apolitical nature of the armed forces and national police[30]. Former Nigerian leader Olusegun Obasanjo representing the UN and Benjamin William Mkapa representing the AU and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region mediated the negotiations[31].

  1. The Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo

(AU)

The accord was signed on February 24, 2013 in Addis Ababa Ethiopia and was aimed at stabilizing the DRC. The agreement was backed by the UN and was also signed by eleven African countries – Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania[32]. The agreement was signed after talks between the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), SADC, the AU and the UN, the framework agreement was eventually signed by Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Congo, the DRC, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia[33]. The agreement called for political reforms in the DRC while requesting neighbouring countries to stop interfering in its affairs and the international community to renew its commitment to helping the country. A UN Special Envoy was to be appointed to support the Framework’s implementation[34].

Eritrea- Djibouti

 

(AU)

 

The AU has lent support to a mediation agreement between Eritrea and Djibouti. Under the guidance of the mediator Qatar’s Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, the countries have signed a deal in which the two countries agreed to settle their border dispute through mediation and peaceful means[35].

Ivory Coast

  1. Linas-Marcoussis Peace Accords

(AU)

The agreement was signed on the 25th of January 2003 and it reaffirmed the Lomé ceasefire agreement, which was made possible through the deployment of French and ECOWAS forces. It was signed by representatives from the government, rebel groups and opposition political parties. The agreement also stated that the Government of National Reconciliation would undertake the process of regrouping its forces under French and ECOWAS supervision[36]. France, UN and African heads of states facilitated the agreements.

  1. Accra II

(AU)

This agreement was continuation of the process begun with the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and was signed on 7 March 2003. The parties assured their full adherence to the Linas-Marcoussis agreement and also attempted to solve new, pressing, issues. It also addressed aspects of the power-sharing arrangements. It was mediated by ECOWAS and Ghana.

  1. Accra III

(AU)

The agreement was signed on 30 July 2004 and it reaffirmed the Marcoussis and Accra II agreements. The parties agreed to start demobilisation on 15 October 2004. Elections were scheduled to be held in October 2005. A National Human Rights Commission was to be established. A tripartite monitoring mechanism consisting of ECOWAS, the African Union and the UN was established.

  1. Pretoria Agreement on the Peace Process in Côte d’Ivoire

(AU)

The agreement called for cessation of hostilities, and reaffirmed the Linas-Marcoussis, Accra II and Accra III agreements. The parties further committed themselves to respecting the sovereignty, independence, integrity and unity of the Ivory Coast. The parties also committed themselves to disarm militias throughout the territory, implement the agreed upon DDR plan and to the formation of a restructured national army. The negotiations were mediated by former South African president Thabo Mbek[37].

  1. Ouagadougou Political Agreement

(AU)

The agreement reaffirmed the commitment of the Forces Nouvelles and the Ivorian government to the Linas-Marcoussis, Accra and Pretoria agreements. It was signed on 4 March, 2007. The accord provided for the merger of the forces of the government and the FN and the deployment of mixed patrols in the former “zone of confidence” that had separated the government-controlled south from the north of Ivory Coast, occupied by the FN. It also included provisions for the identification of the population, the establishment of a green line observed by the United Nations as replacement of the area formerly covered by the “zone of confidence”; the disarmament of militias and their reintegration through civic service programmes; amnesty for crimes committed since September 2000[38]. Blaise Compaoré, President of Burkina Faso and head of ECOWAS facilitated the negotiations. The agreement was followed by four Complementary Agreements to the Ouagadougou Political Agreement which were all facilitated by Compaoré.

NB: In December 2010, Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga was appointed AU mediator for the Ivorian crisis. He held talks with the conflicting parties in December 2010 and January 2011. On January 19, 2011 Odinga announced that mediation to resolve the dispute had failed. The AU Peace and Security Council then established an expanded mediation panel comprising of African heads of state from Burkina Faso, Chad, South Africa, Mauritania and Nigeria.

Guinea-Bissau

  1. Abuja Peace Agreement

(AU)

 

The agreement was signed on 1 November 1998 by President Joao Bernardo Vieira representing the government and General Ansumane Mane, leader of the military junta. The agreement reaffirmed the ceasefire and resolved that the withdrawal of the Senegalese and Guinean troops be conducted simultaneously with the deployment of an ECOMOG interposition force. Furthermore, the agreement stipulated for a government of national unity, comprising both rebels and members of the present government, to be formed and for elections to be held no later than March 1999[39].On 15 December an Additional Protocol to the Abuja agreement was signed which outlined the composition of the Government of National Unity. ECOWAS mediated the negotiation process.

  1. Tripoli Plan of Action on Guinea Bissau

(AU)

On August 31, 2010 The Tripoli Plan of Action was endorsed by the AU which stressed the need to ensure the early deployment in Guinea Bissau, with the support of the UN, the EU and other AU partners, of a joint AU-ECOWAS stabilization mission to consolidate peace and stability. The mission has furthermore lent the necessary support to the Government in security sector reform, post-conflict reconstruction and development and fight against drug trafficking. In October the AU appointed Prof. Sebastiao da Silva Isata, from Angola, as his Special Representative for Guinea Bissau.

Kenya

The National Accord

(AU)

Following the violence that erupted in the aftermath of the 2007 presidential elections, a series of negotiations took place between President Mwai Kibaki’s Party of National Unityand opposition Orange Democratic Movement led by Raila Odinga. The negotiations were mediated by the African Union’s Panel of Eminent Africans, which was led by Kofi Annan. The agreement gave birth to the Unity government. The parties agreed to end the violence, address the humanitarian situation, and resolve the political crisis. The parties agreed to examine long-standing sources of grievances and establish an Independent Review Commission to examine the electoral process. They also agreed to form a Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission, a Commission on Inquiry on Post-Election Violence and a Constitutional Review Commission[40].

Liberia

  1. Banjul III Agreement

(OAU)

The agreement was signed on the 24th of October 1990, in Gambia, by the government of Liberia and the INPFL movement. It contained a ceasefire arrangement which entailed a cessation of all military activity, and a confinement of troops to locations determined in consultation with the ECOMOG force[41]. It also provided for the release of all hostages, political prisoners and prisoners of war. The negotiations were mediated Gambia and the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee[42].

  1. Bamako Ceasefire Agreement

(OAU)

Signed on the 28th of November, 1990 by all the parties in the Liberian conflict, the agreement contained a ceasefire. The parties also agreed to resolve their differences with regards to the formation of an Interim Government[43]. The agreement was facilitated by ECOWAS states.

  1. Banjul IV Agreement

(OAU)

The agreement was signed on the 21st of December, 1990 by Warring Parties of Liberia. It included a continuation of the ceasefire agreed upon in the Bamako agreement and the formation of an Interim government. The parties also agreed that all seaports and airports would be considered military free zones[44]. The agreement was brokered by ECOWAS states.

An All-Liberian National Conference was to be held within 60 days to discuss the modalities involved in the establishment of an interim regime. The Interim government was to disarm the warring parties upon its formation.

  1. Lomé Agreement

(OAU)

The agreement was signed on 13 February 1991 by The Armed Forces of Liberia, The National Patriotic Front of Liberia and The Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia. The agreement included a ceasefire plan and disarmament. The agreement stipulated for the appointment of a new interim government and presidential and legislative elections had been called for October 1991. The Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) which was established by ECOWAS in May 1990 mediated the negotiations[45].

  1. Yamoussoukro IV Peace Agreement

(OAU)

Signed on 30 October 1991, agreement included a ceasefire, the creation of a buffer zone on the Liberian-Sierra Leonean border, disarmament by ECOMOG and national elections within 6 months[46]. It was signed by the warring parties in Liberia. The negotiations were led by ECOWAS.

  1. Akosombo Peace Agreement
  2. (OAU)

The agreement was signed in Ghana on 12 September, 1994. The agreement contained some amendments to the agreements reached on the armed forces. Total demobilization remained as the main regulation of conflict behaviour, but new specifications for the establishment of a new military force were made. The demobilization of the troops and the subsequent formation of a new national army were to be the responsibility of the Transitional Government. It was signed by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy and Armed Forces of Liberia[47]. The talks were facilitated by Ghana.

  1. Abuja Peace Agreement

(OAU)

The agreement was signed on 19 August, 1995 by the warring factions. The Abuja Accord managed to bring the leaders of all warring factions into the transitional government. A new ceasefire was declared and took effect on 26 August 1995. The talks were brokered by ECOWAS, Nigeria, OAU and UN[48].

  1. Abuja II Peace Agreement

(OAU)

The agreement was signed on 17 August, 1996 and was a supplement to the first Abuja Peace Agreement. It extended the life span of the Transitional Government. ECOWAS facilitated the agreement.

  1. Accra Ceasefire Agreement

(AU)

Signed on the 17th June, 2003, the agreement was signed by Hon. Daniel L. Chea Snr. Minister of National Defence of the Republic of Liberia (GOL), Mr. Kabineh Janneh (LURD) and Mr. Tiah J.D. Slanger (MODEL). The warring parties committed themselves to refraining from any act that might constitute a violation of the agreement, and an ECOWAS joint verification team was to be set up. In addition, a joint monitoring committee (ECOWAS, UN, African Union and the ICGL) would monitor the ceasefire. The parties agreed on the need for the deployment of an international stabilization force in Liberia. The warring parties, political parties and stakeholders were to engage in dialogue to seek a lasting peace agreement[49]. The agreement was mediated by General Abdulsalami Abubakar and representatives from ECOWAS, UN, AU and ICGL.

  1. Accra Peace Agreement

(AU)

The agreement was signed on 18 August, 2003 and it provided for the establishment of a transitional power-sharing government called the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL). The parties reaffirmed the earlier ceasefire and agreed to a national process of cantonment, disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration of the armed forces[50]. It was signed by all the warring parties in Liberia. General Abdulsalami Abubakar mediated the negotiations. ECOMIL and UNMIL were also involved.

Libya

  1. Algiers Agreement

(OAU)

The agreement was signed on the 31st of August 1989 by Libya and Chad. And was a Framework Agreement on the peaceful settlement of the territorial dispute. The parties reaffirmed the ceasefire, and agreed to end any support to the hostile forces of either of the two countries. They also agreed to withdraw their troops from the area within a year unless a political settlement allowed them to remain[51]. The countries agreed to exchange prisoners-of-war and end media attacks on each other. The agreement also provided for the establishment of a mixed commission to oversee the implementation of the agreement. the OAU and Algeria facilitated the talks.

Madagascar

Political Road map

(AU)

On 17 September 2011, Madagascar’s rival parties signed an agreement that was meant to pave the way for elections within a year and for the lifting of sanctions that were imposed by SADC following the 2009 coup. The agreement also provided for the unconditional return of former president Marc Ravalomanana, who had gone into exile after he had been ousted in 2009[52]. Former Mozambican president Joaquim Chissano was nominated by SADC to mediate the talks. Chissano received assistance from the AU, UN and the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF)[53]

Mali

On April 11, 1992, the Malian Government and the Azawad Unified Movements and Fronts (MFUA) signed the National Pact. The Pact was signed in Bamako and finalized the Mopti Accord, which had been signed in 1991. The agreement stipulated a new ceasefire, which forbade further movements of troops and froze the armed forces of both parties in the locations they occupied. A military pact was made, in which the Tuareg rebels were to be voluntarily integrated into the military, police or gendarmerie. The North was to be completely demilitarized. The agreement finalized the provisions of the Mopti accord, amending the political structure of Mali through a decentralization of authority to regional and sub-regional assemblies of an executive character. The National Pact was mediated by Algeria and the country was also a guarantor of the Pact. Ahmed Baba Miske (from Mauritania) and Edgar Pisani (France) also played a role in the mediation leading up to the National Pact[54].

Mozambique

The Acordo Geral de Paz (AGP)

The agreement was signed on the 4th of 1992 by the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO. The talks were mediated by The Roman Catholic community of Saint Egidio, the Archbishop of Beira and the Italian government[55]. This agreement incorporated all the protocols that had been signed by the parties and it finalized the peace process. According to the agreement, a ceasefire was to come into place after its ratification by the assembly, under which a phased cessation of hostilities was stipulated. Both forces were to withdraw from their positions to encampment sites where they were either integrated into the new armed units, or demobilized. The final agreement contained a military pact, which stipulated that a new army consisting of 30 000 men would be established, with each party contributing 15,000 men each. The remainders of the forces were to be disarmed and demobilized under UN supervision[56].

Nigeria

The Greentree agreement

The agreement was signed on 12 June 2006 by Nigeria and Cameroon. The agreement provided for the withdrawal of Nigerian troops from the Bakassi Peninsula and was facilitated by the UN, Germany, the US, France and the UK.

Niger

  1. Agreement establishing permanent peace between the government of Niger and ORA

On the 15th of April 1995 the Niger government signed a comprehensive peace agreement with the Coordination of the Armed Resistance (CRA), now renamed the ORA in Niamey, Niger. The agreement instituted a ceasefire, and also reaffirmed the earlier ceasefire from 1994. The agreement further stipulated a restructuring of the armed forces of Niger, which entailed an integration of ORA fighters into its ranks. There were also reforms in the security sector, with rebel integration into these forces and the creation of a special security task force for the northern areas of Niger (Air and Azawad). It was mediated by Algeria, France and Burkina Faso, and a peace committee was established to ensure implementation of the agreement. Maï Maï Gana signed the agreement for the government of Niger, Rissa Ag Bula for the ORA, Laala Mohamed for the Algerian mediators, Alain Deschamps for the French mediators and Ablassé Ouedrago for the Burkinabe mediators[57].

  1. The inter- Niger Dialogue

(AU)

After limited progress made by the Inter-Nigerien Dialogue established by ECOWAS mediator General Abdulsalami A. Abubakar, which started on 21 December 2009, the AU appointed Prof. Albert Tevoedejre in March 2010 as Special Envoy for Niger. The appointment was part of support provided by the AU to strengthen the mediation efforts of Abubakar. The Special Envoy was tasked to work towards the establishment of a consensual roadmap leading to the restoration of the constitutional order and the holding of free and fair multiparty elections[58].

Rwanda

Arusha Accords

(OAU)

Signed on 4 August 1993, the Arusha Accords comprised a general agreement and six attached protocols that were all combined into a whole to form this comprehensive agreement[59]. The parties reaffirmed the N´Sele Ceasefire Agreement, the first of the six agreements, which instated a Neutral Corridor separating the warring parties from each other. The agreement provided for the establishment of a power sharing arrangement and also allowed for repatriation of all Rwandan refugees and the return of internally displaced persons to their homes. It was facilitated b Tanzania, the OAU and the UN.

Sierra Leone

  1. Abidjan Peace Agreement

(OAU)

Signed on 30 November 1996, the agreement was signed by the government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front. The agreement stipulated a cessation of hostilities and military reforms. To monitor the ceasefire a Joint Monitoring Group comprising the government and RUF and a Neutral Monitoring Group comprising members from the international community were established[60]. Political reforms included the restructuring of the National Electoral Commission, and the transformation of the RUF/SL into a legal political party that would enjoy freedom of the press, access to the media and other democratic rights. The talks were facilitated by Cote d’Ivoire; the United Nations; the Organization of African Unity (OAU); the Commonwealth Organization[61].

  1. Lomé Peace Agreement

(OAU)

The agreement was signed on 7 July 1999 by the government of Sierra Leone and RUF. The agreement stipulated a ceasefire and a cessation of hostilities, to be monitored by a committee chaired by UNOMSIL and participated in by the government and RUF[62]. A new national army was to be formed as well. A general amnesty was issued and a program for the voluntary return of refugees and IDP’s was established. The agreement was signed under the auspices of ECOWAS, Togo, Burkina Faso, Liberia, Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, OAU, UN, and the Commonwealth[63]. The agreement was followed by the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement which reaffirmed earlier agreements and also paved the way for the recommencing of the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme.

Somalia

  1. Addis Ababa Agreement

On 27 March 1993, a partial peace agreement was signed in Addis Ababa by the various parties involved in the Somali conflict. In the agreement the parties firstly committed themselves to a previously signed ceasefire agreement, and to complete disarmament through the handover of weapons to UNITAF/UNOSOM (the multinational United Task Force that was transformed into the UN Operation in Somalia). A restructuring of the national police force would commence, in order to create an impartial national and regional police force.

Secondly, the parties agreed to set up a Transitional National Council (TNC) and three other transitional organs, for a period of two years, which would eventually lead to democratic governance, the rule of law, decentralisation of power, and the protection of human rights and individual liberties. The TNC would have legislative functions during the transition period, and it would further establish an independent judiciary. It would be composed of representatives from all regions in Somalia and all political factions that participated in the National Reconciliation Conference (and consequently signed the agreement). Moreover, Central Administrative Departments, Regional Councils and District Councils would be established. Hence, the incompatibility of government was given a solution through this agreement.

The agreement was signed after 13 days of negotiations brokered by the UN. It was signed by Mohammed Qanyare Afrah (government), Gen. Mohammed Farah H Aideed (USC faction), Mohamed R. Arbow (SAMO), Mohamed F. Abdullahi (SDA), Addi Musse Mavow (SDM), Mohamed Nur Alio (SDM/SNA), Ali Ismail Abdi (SNDU), Gen. Omar Haji Mohamed (SNF), Mohamed Rajis Mohamed (SNU), Gen. Aden Abdulluhi Nur (SPM), Ahmed Hashi Mahmmud (SPM/SNA), Gen. Mohdammed Abshir Mussa (SSDF), Abdi Warsame Isaq (SSNM), Abdurahman Dualch Al (USF) and Mohamed Abdi Hashi (USP)[64]

  1. The Djibouti Agreement (19 August 2008)

This agreement marked the official signing of a political agreement between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) that had been agreed on earlier. The agreement provided for the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops. The UN mediated the negotiations and was signed by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS)[65].

This agreement was followed by the Decision of the High Level Committee, Djibouti Agreement. The agreement provided a framework for the establishment of a Unity Government, consisting of members drawn from both the TFG and the ARS. The negotiations were also mediated by the United Nations and were signed by Ahmed Abdisalaan Adan of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Abdirahman A. Warsame of the Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS)[66].

Sudan

  1. Machakos Protocol

The agreement was signed on 20 July 2002 by SPLM/A, and the government of Sudan. The framework agreement included the general procedures for a transitional process and an agreement to hold further negotiations to specify the terms of the framework. It also included a pre-transition period of six months, a six-year transition period, followed by an internationally supervised referendum on Southern Sudan’s independence. During the transition period a broad-based government would rule and the southern states would be given some degree of autonomy[67]. The agreement was facilitated by Kenya and was witnessed by IGAD.

  1. Agreement on Security Arrangements During the Interim Period

The agreement was signed on the 25th of September 2003 and it was part of the Machakos process. The parties agreed that an internationally monitored ceasefire would come into place once the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed[68]. They also agreed that during the interim period a small number of joint/integrated units would be created to be stationed in Southern Sudan, Khartoum, the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile territories. Kenya facilitated the agreement.

  1. Framework on Wealth Sharing During the Pre-Interim and Interim Period

Signed on the 7th of January 2004, the agreement was also part of the Machakos process. The parties agreed on a 50-50 split of oil revenues in southern Sudan. They also agreed on separate banking systems in the north and the south. Kenya facilitated the agreement.

  1. Protocol Between the GOS and SPLM on Power Sharing

The agreement was signed on the 26th May, 2004 and it was also part of the Machakos process. Central to this agreement were; the establishment of an interim constitution, the creation of a Government of Southern Sudan and a power-sharing arrangement at the central government level[69]. The agreement was also facilitated by Kenya.

  1. The Protocol Between the GOS and SPLM on the Resolution of Conflict in Abyei Area

The agreement was also signed on the 26th of May 2004 and it was also part of the Machakos process. It dealt with the issue of the Abyei area on the border between Northern and Southern Sudan[70]. The agreement stated that a joint battalion, comprised of forces from SPLM/A, and the Government of the Sudan, was to be stationed in the area through the Interim period.

  1. The Protocol Between the GOS and SPLM on the Resolution of Conflict in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States

The agreement was also signed on the 26th of May 2004 and was part of the Machakos protocol. The parties agreed on the administration of these contested areas on the border between the north and the south. The agreement reaffirmed the standing of the two entities of Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile States as federal states of Sudan. The parties agreed to a power-sharing arrangement in the state legislature of these two entities, with 55% of seats in the hands of the NPC (the party governing Sudan) and 45% of seats under the control of the SPLM[71]. Kenya facilitated the agreement.

  1. Cairo Framework Agreement between the GoS and the NDA

The agreement was signed on the 15th of January 2005 by the government of Sudan and the umbrella rebel group NDA. The framework agreement outlined the issues involved in reaching a comprehensive peace and complemented the SPLM peace agreement[72]. It called for the abolishing emergency laws and statutes restricting freedoms. It also provided methods of allowing for power sharing and the dissolution of NDA forces. Negotiations were held in Egypt, and Egyptian officials presided over the signing ceremony.

  1. Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement

(AU)

Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed on 9 January, 2005 was the final peace agreement that concluded the Machakos process that had been on-going since July 2002. After signing several partial agreements, (also referred to as protocols) the parties managed to agree on all details of the agreement. some of the issues agreed on included; the south was to be given autonomy for an interim period of 6 years, followed by a referendum in 2011 with the option of independence from Sudan; John Garang, the leader of SPLM/A, was to appointed First Vice President, and SPLM/A was also given 28 per cent of the seats in the National Government[73]. The mediation of the agreements was led by IGAD, and facilitated by the international community. A referendum was held in January 2011 and the republic of South Sudan was born.

  1. Agreement between the GoS and the NDA (Cairo Agreement)

The agreement was signed on 18 June 2005 and was signed by the Government of Sudan and the NDA. The agreement stipulated that Sudan would be a multiparty non-confessional democracy with equal rights for all citizens and be open to all political parties. The NDA, previously being banned and in exile, were to be allowed to return to Sudan to conduct democratic politics and take part in the drafting of the new Sudanese constitution[74]. Negotiations were held in Egypt.

  1. Darfur Peace Agreement

(AU)

The Darfur Peace Agreement was signed on 5 May 2006 by the Government of Sudan and the SLM/MM (Minni Mannawi faction). The agreement covered such issues as national and state power-sharing, demilitarization of the Janjaweed and other militias, an integration of SLM/A and JEM troops into the Sudanese Armed Forces and police, a system of federal wealth-sharing for the promotion of Darfurian economic interests, a referendum on the future status of Darfur and measures to promote the flow of humanitarian aid into the region[75].

The agreement also contained a comprehensive ceasefire agreement (CFA), which reaffirmed in particular the N’Dajema Agreement of April 2004. The CFA forbade mobilization, recruitment, military actions and propaganda, and stipulated the release of all detainees. It also contained measures to protect humanitarian aid routes and IDPs[76]. It was meant to be signed by SLM/AW and JEM as well as SLM/MM, but the two former groups refused to sign, leading to the peace agreement mentioning all groups, but applying only to SLM/MM. The AU was the chief mediator in the negotiations.

  1. The Doha Agreement

On 23 February 2010 JEM and the government of Sudan signed a peace process agreement in Doha, capital of Qatar. The agreement was negotiated by Chad and three days before the signature of this agreement a ceasefire agreement was signed in the Chadian capital, N’Djamena. The agreement states that JEM will become a political party after the signing of a final agreement. Moreover, it is stipulated that JEM should share power at all levels and that the administration of Darfur will be part of a final agreement[77]

  1. Addis Ababa Agreement

(AU)

The agreement was signed on the 28th of June 2011 by the government of Sudan and SPLM/A-North. The chief negotiator for the agreement was the former South African President Thabo Mbeki who represented the African Union[78]. The agreement pledged to pave the way for comprehensive political and security arrangements of the two contested states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile. It also stipulated that a joint political committee will be formed and that the issue of governance in the states should be resolved by the joint committee. The agreement also included principles on cessation of hostilities and ceasefire. The contested issue of disarmament was also included and it was agreed that any disarmament should be done in amicably[79].

  1. Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of Abyei Area

(AU)

The agreement was signed on 20 June 2011. It was signed by Sudan and South Sudan. The agreement provided a temporary administrative arrangement for Abyei. The agreement also stipulated the redeployment from Abyei of military forces of the government of Sudan and South Sudan. In addition, an Interim Security Force for Abyei (ISFA) composed of Ethiopian troops was to be deployed[80]. The negotiations leading to the signing of the agreement were facilitated by the African Union High Level Implementation Panel led by Thabo Mbeki

  1. Addis Ababa Agreement on Border Issues

The agreement was signed on 27 September 2012 by the governments of Sudan and South Sudan. The agreement stipulated that the border between Sudan and South Sudan should be soft and peaceful. It also included the commitment of the two countries to demarcate the border[81]. It was facilitated by the African Union High Level Implementation Panel

  1. Addis Ababa Agreement on Cooperation

The agreement was also signed on the 27th of September 2012. The peace agreement brought together several agreements signed between the two parties. It stipulated that the two nations cooperate over issues such as border issues, security arrangements and economic issues (oil in particular)[82]. The negotiations leading up to the agreement were led by African Union High Level Implementation Panel and IGAD.

  1. Addis Ababa Agreement on Security Arrangements

Also signed on September 27 2012, the agreement called for both parties to withdraw their forces from each other’s territories. It also stated that a demilitarized zone between the two parties was to be created[83]. African Union High Level Implementation Panel led the negotiations.

Uganda

  1. Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and Lord’s Resistance Army

 

(AU)

The agreement was signed on 2 May 2007 was signed as part of the Juba peace process, which began in mid-2006[84]. The accord provided general guidelines for addressing the long-term economic, political and social issues that afflicted northern Uganda. Under the accord equal opportunities and treatment, diversity in government institutions, redevelopment of the North’s economic and educational infrastructure and the resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) were identified as prioritised areas in building a sustainable peace[85]. Dr. Samson L. Kwaje from South Sudan mediated the negotiations.

  1. Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lord\’s Resistance Army/Movement

 

(AU)

This was the second agreement to be signed under the Juba process and was signed on 29 June 2007. The agreement provided for the formation of a domestic legal framework that would function as a substitute for ICC prosecutions. This was to be complemented by alternative processes like traditional justice[86]. Under the accord, the rebel commanders that were accused of serious crimes were to face formal criminal and civil justice proceedings in courts, which could impose alternative penalties and sanctions. Abuses by the national army were to be pursued in the criminal justice system. South Sudan mediated the talks.

  1. Agreement on Implementation and Monitoring Mechanisms

(AU)

The agreement was signed on the 29 February 2008 and it included all the agreements that had been signed in the Juba process. Under the accord, the parties agreed on an Implementation Schedule which was to be attached to the Final Peace Agreement, setting out all relevant dates and timeframes. Furthermore, the agreement also provided for the establishment of an ‘Oversight Forum’ to oversee and monitor the implementation of the Final Peace Agreement and to provide advice and support to the parties and any relevant institutions established under the Final Peace Agreement[87]. South Sudan mediated the talks. Several African countries were also involved in the process.

Zimbabwe

Global Political Agreement

(AU)

The agreement was signed on the 15th of September 2008 by ZANU PF and the two MDC formations following the disputed 2008 harmonised elections. The country had experienced widespread political violence after the election. The AU, UN and SADC endorsed former South African president Thabo Mbeki as mediator of the Zimbabwe crisis[88]. The agreement gave birth to the current Government of National Unity. The parties agreed to work together to create a genuine, viable, permanent, sustainable and nationally acceptable solution to the Zimbabwe situation and in particular to implement the GPA with the aims of resolving the political and economic situations and charting a new political direction for the country[89].

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UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia. Burundi. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=26&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#

UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia. Central African Republic www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=31&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa

UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia. Comoros. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=36&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa

UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia. Congo. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=37&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#

UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia. D.R Congo. http://www.espncricinfo.com/indian-premier-league-2013/engine/match/598027.html

UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia. Ivory Coast. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=40&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#

UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia. Guinea-Bissau http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=68&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#

United States Institute of Peace. “Kenya: Setting the Stage for Durable Peace?” http://www.usip.org/publications/kenya-setting-stage-durable-peace

UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia. Liberia. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=94&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#

UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia. Libya. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=95&regionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#

UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia. Mali. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=103&regionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#

UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia. Mozambique. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=111&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#

UCDP. Conflict Encyclopaedia, Niger. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=118&regionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#

UN News Centre (2013) “UN urges long-term commitment to today’s peace deal on DR Congo”. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44211#.UXeQXLVHKKJ Accessed 24/04/2013

UCDP. Conflict Encyclopaedia. Rwanda. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=133&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#

UCDP. Conflict Encyclopaedia. Sierra Leone. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=136&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#

UCDP. Conflict Encyclopaedia, Somalia. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=118&regionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#

UCDP. Conflict Encyclopaedia, Sudan. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=118&regionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#

UCDP. Conflict Encyclopaedia. Uganda. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=160&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#

 

[1] UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia. Angola. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=4&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa

[2] ibid

[3] ibid

[4] ibid

[5] ibid

[6] ibid

[7] ibid

[8] UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia. Burundi. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=26&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#

[9] ibid

[10] ibid

[11] ibid

[12] ibid

[13] ibid

[14] ibid

[15] ibid

[16] ibid

[17] ibid

[18] UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia. Central African Republic www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=31&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa

[19]  UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia. Comoros. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=36&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa

[20] ibid

[21] UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia. Congo. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=37&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#

[22] ibid

[23] UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia. D.R Congo. http://www.espncricinfo.com/indian-premier-league-2013/engine/match/598027.html

[24] ibid

[25] ibid

[26] ibid

[27] ibid

[28] ibid

[29] ibid

[30] ibid

[31] ibid

[32] UN News Centre (2013) “UN urges long-term commitment to today’s peace deal on DR Congo”. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44211#.UXeQXLVHKKJ Accessed 24/04/2013

[33] Institute for Security Studies (2013) Congo-Kinshasa: Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC – Hopes and Challenges. Found on All Africa. http://allafrica.com/stories/201303081098.html

[34] ibid

[35] Defenceweb.co.za, ‘African Union welcomes Eritrea-Djibouti mediation deal’, 09 June, 2010.

Available at:

http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8382:african-union-welcomes-eritrea-djibouti-mediation-deal&catid=52:Human%20Security&Itemid=114

[36] UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia. Ivory Coast. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=40&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#

[37] ibid

[38] ibid

[39] UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia. Guinea-Bissau http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=68&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#

[40] United States Institute of Peace. “Kenya: Setting the Stage for Durable Peace?” http://www.usip.org/publications/kenya-setting-stage-durable-peace

[41] UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia. Liberia. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=94&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#

[42] ibid

[43] ibid

[44] ibid

[45] ibid

[46] ibid

[47] ibid

[48] ibid

[49] ibid

[50] ibid

[51] UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia. Libya. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=95&regionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#

[52] Reuters (2011) “Political leaders accept roadmap to elections” France24. http://www.france24.com/en/20110917-madagascar-leaders-rajoelina-roadmap-elections-ravalomanana-sadc

[53] Lesley Connolly (2013) The troubled road to peace: Reflections on the complexities

of resolving the political impasse in Madagascar. ACCORD Policy & Practice Brief. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/The%20troubled%20road%20to%20peace%20Reflections%20on%20the%20complexities%20of%20resolving%20the%20political%20impasse%20in%20Madagascar.pdf

[54] UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia. Mali. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=103&regionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#

[55] UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia. Mozambique. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=111&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#

[56] ibid

[57] UCDP. Conflict Encyclopaedia, Niger. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=118&regionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#

[58] African Press Organisation, ‘Appointment of Professor Albert Tevoedjere as Special Envoy of the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union for Niger’, 4 March 2010. http://appablog.wordpress.com/2010/03/04/appointment-of-professor-albert-tevoedjere-as-special-envoy-of-the-chairperson-of-the-commission-of-the-african-union-for-niger/

[59] UCDP. Conflict Encyclopaedia. Rwanda. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=133&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#

[60] UCDP. Conflict Encyclopaedia. Sierra Leone. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=136&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#

[61] ibid

[62] ibid

[63] ibid

[64] UCDP. Conflict Encyclopaedia, Somalia. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=118&regionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#

[65] ibid

[66] ibid

[67] UCDP. Conflict Encyclopaedia, Sudan. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=118&regionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#

[68] ibid

[69] ibid

[70] ibid

[71] ibid

[72] ibid

[73] UCDP. Conflict Encyclopaedia, Sudan. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=118&regionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#

[74] ibid

[75] ibid

[76] ibid

[77] ibid

[78] ibid

[79] ibid

[80] ibid

[81] ibid

[82] ibid

[83] ibid

[84] UCDP. Conflict Encyclopaedia. Uganda. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=160&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#

[85]

[86] ibid

[87] ibid

[88] Reuters (2008). “AU, U.N. endorse Mbeki mediation of Zimbabwe talks”, http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/07/18/us-zimbabwe-crisis-talks-idUSWEA241520080718

[89] COPAC. Global Political Agreement. Zimbabwe http://www.copac.org.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19:gpa-leadership&catid=29:the-cms&Itemid=128

Legitimacy and resilience in national dialogue processes

20150630_160033

Dear reader.

Great to see that you are checking back in.

This time, I wanted to share with you a picture from the 28th annual conference of the International Association for Conflict Management, IACM, held in Clearwater, Florida.

My dear friend and colleague, Professor Mark Whitlock, was there in mind and spirit, yet I was able to propose good arguments to take a renewed look at a joint research project, focusing on understanding the dimensions of legitimacy of political actors and resilience of local actors in national dialogue processes. Based on variables of effectiveness, legitimacy and resilience, we are able to explore options to sustain national dialogue processes.

While I will be sharing with you further infos and documents, it has been an interesting journey, understanding the legitimacy as a variable is a contested issue, that no one has ever tried to scale up resilience from the local to the national level, and that national dialogue is an elusive concept.

There is a lot to do and we are therefore investigating 6 cases: Mali, Yemen, Colombia, Myanmar, South Sudan and Central African Republic.

Stay tuned…

Peace Agreements – Lessons learned from local peace agreements

The elephant in the room - the value of local peace agreements

Dear reader.

Thank you for checking back in on the learned mediator’s blog.

A question that I am trying to answer has already been brought up in another article I posted on this site, looking at the spill-over effect of local peace agreements to forge alliances, peace coalitions and reconciliation. This is a strategy that the current UN Special Envoy to Syria is trying to pursue. However, we have to concede that there are some intricate regional dynamics that overshadow any conducive peace environment.

Yet, there is merit in looking at some successful examples of locally brokered peace agreements and the question is on how to scale up the local to the national so as to foster a durable peace environment.

Based on field research in the Karimojong cluster (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karamojong_people), I have started to unearth some local treaties that reflect on a few lessons learned to understand how certain processes have led to resilient people at the local level and on how durable the peace is due to the durability of the peace agreement. Albeit not complete as of yet, I thought I’d share some of the insights with you, as I am working on exploring and investigating resilience in national dialogue processes.

What is it?
The Lokiriama Peace Accord:
The Lokiriama Peace Accord is so far the most successful accord in the Karamoja cluster and it is instrumental for the current peace enjoyed between the Turkana of Kenya and the Matheniko and Teeth of Uganda. The Accord was signed on Dec. 19th, 1973 at the current Lokiriama trading center at the border area – between Uganda and Kenya and between the Matheniko of Uganda and the Turkana of Kenya. A Teeth community traditional Seer from Uganda is said to have been instrumental in foreseeing the Accord. It came into fruition after a long-drawn inter-tribal conflict that led hundreds of lives lost. The Matheniko emissaries camped at Lokiriama for a month, negotiating for ceasefire and eternal peace with the Turkana until an agreement was reached. The event culminated into the sealing of the pact, by symbolically burying the hatchet, comprising an assortment of broken arrows, guns, spears, bows and ammunitions in a deep pit at Lokiriama.

To what end?
The purpose of the Accord was to bring to an end the raids, killings and tremendous suffering that was arising from the attacks and retaliations between the two communities. Under the Accord, the two communities vowed never to fight again. In fact, in 2015, the communities saw the Accord tested, when 5 donkeys were stolen, and the Ugandan community had to bring one of their own to justice. The two communities gathered, the elders explored the issues, compensation was discussed, and justice was obtained based on compensation. No further conflicts nor issues arose. Many observers stress that it goes back to the 42 years long lasting peace agreement, the systemic changes to the people and the way they deal and manage conflict through peaceful means and through reconciliation. The Accord highlighted the issue of brotherhood (Ubuntu in Southern Africa) and the realization that there is no value in fighting. It strongly hinged upon the acceptance of win-win instead of a zero-sum outcome.

What do we learn?
Lessons learned from the Accord:
– Community ownership in the signing and implementation of the Accord;
– Community integration through inter-communal marriages among Turkana and Karimojong;
– Joint resource sharing (grazing lands, water points);
– Joint trade;
– Establishment of joint committees of Elders;
– Effective preparation to negotiations that involved one month prior to signing.
Since the 1973, the Accord has never been broken and there has never been a fight between the two borderland groups due to communal sharing of resources and enhancement of trade and economic opportunities between these communities.
What is it?
The Moru-Nayece Peace Accord:
It is celebrated on Dec. 21st, every year by the Ateker family, bringing on board the Turkana, Karimojong, Iteso, Nyangatom, and the Toposa. Moruanayece is located in the Letea district, Oropoi Division of present Turkana West sub-county where Mother Nayece lived many years ago and where her remains were buried. The name Moruanayece literally means The Hill of Nayece. She was a woman who was born in Jie Kotido District, Uganda. Nayece is said to be the first person who settled the caves (Aturkan) in Turkana land and hence the people and the land became known as Turkana. Since Nayece came from Jie, the Turkana people view Jie as “Amuro ka Ata”, which translated means “The Thigh of the Grandmother” or “The Pillar of the Grandmother”. There is a belief that before Mother Nayece passed on, she had decreed that there be no conflict between the Turkana and the Jie, warning that in case it occurred, the two groups should always come to her graveside and perform the ceremony of Forgiveness.

What do we learn?
This Accord has become a peacemaking ground for the entire Ateker and a way of promoting unity and peace among them in the spirit of brotherhood (Ubuntu). The celebrations have attracted more than 5000 people since 2010 and can be viewed as a belief-driven system for forgiveness and reconciliation.

What is it?
The Nabilatuk/Moruitit/Lokichigio Resolution (in short Nabilatuk Resolution):
The Nabilatuk Resolution was passed in 2012, in Nakapiritpirit and was later later adopted as the Moruitit Resolution. The Resolution has been lauded as a key measure in preventing cattle raiding and theft. The Nabilatuk Resolution involved Southern Karamoja (Nakapiritpirit, Moroto, Napak, and Amudat). As a result of its effectiveness, it was adopted by Northern Karamoja (Kotido and Kaabong).

To what end?
The key highlight of the Resolution is the 1×2+1 Principle – as a deterrent measure to cattle raiding. According to this principle, any one apprehended with stolen animals is supposed to pay the total number of cows raided/stolen, multiplied by 2. The culprit is also supposed to pay 1 extra bull that is usually slaughtered and eaten by the Elders and those who might have been taking part in the recovery.

What do we learn?
On June 6th, 2015, the Resolution was further adopted during the tripartite meeting of Uganda, Kenya and South Sudan in Lokichogio – henceforth called the Lokichogio Declaration. The principle therefore among other communities now applies to the communities of Dodoth, Turkana and Toposa.

To  be continued…